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Managing without default retirement in universities: a comparative picture 
from Australia 
 
The abolition of the default retirement age is creating challenges for UK employers, and 
universities in particular. Operating without mandatory retirement may have consequences 
for performance management, the creation of opportunities for new generations of workers, 
the scope for workforce planning and employment costs. Drawing on comparative 
experiences of Australian universities, which have been operating without mandatory 
retirement since the 1990s, this article critically examines whether these consequences have 
materialised in Australia. It draws out a number of lessons for UK universities from the 
Australian experience.   
1) Introduction 
In 2011 the UK Coalition government changed the face of retirement policy almost overnight 
by abolishing the national default retirement age (‘DRA’). While employers may still adopt 
an Employer-Justified Retirement Age (‘EJRA’) to manage the end of the employment 
relationship, there remains significant uncertainty regarding when a retirement age will be 
‘justified’, leaving many employers in a state of limbo. Indeed, anecdotal evidence indicates 
that many employers are choosing to abandon fixed retirement ages rather than risk a legal 
challenge from retired employees.
1
 UK employers therefore now face a brave new world of 
workplace relations, where retirement must generally be managed on a case-by-case basis 
and negotiated with individual employees.  
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 These changes are particularly significant for universities. Academic work is intrinsically 
rewarding and involves few physical demands, meaning many academics wish to continue 
their employment into old age.
2
 In a survey of academic staff at 12 UK higher education 
institutions, 29% indicated that they would prefer to retire over the age of 65 and 36% 
expected to retire after the age of 65.
3
 Therefore, a significant proportion of academic staff 
are likely to continue to work beyond a traditional retirement age of 65 if a DRA is not 
imposed.
4
  
 
At the same time, there is concern that UK universities lack the human resource practices to 
manage an ageing academic workforce without a DRA. Prior to the abolition of the DRA, 
many UK higher education employers used mandatory retirement for their academic staff, 
and few accepted requests to continue to work beyond the DRA.
5
 The abolition of the DRA 
may therefore raise challenges for UK universities, particularly in relation to the performance 
management of academic staff, the creation of opportunities for new generations of 
                                                 
2
 See, for example, L Rosenman and S McDonald ‘How should universities respond to the abolition of 
compulsory retirement?’ (1995) 38 Australian Universities’ Review 63, p 63. 
3
 S Manfredi and L Vickers ‘Retirement and age discrimination: managing retirement in higher education’ 
(2009) 38 Ind Law J 343, p 357. 
4
 Ibid, p 356; see also C Moughton and S Manfredi ‘Managing flexible retirement and extended working lives: a 
resource guide’ (Oxford: 2011) p 5. 
5
 Manfredi and Vickers, above n 3, p 364; cf S Manfredi and L Vickers ‘Pensioning off the mandatory 
retirement age: implications for the higher education sector’ (2013) 33 LS 289, p 293. Under the Employment 
Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1031, employers were required to consider an employee’s request to 
work beyond the retirement age and could only retire an employee in accordance with complicated procedural 
provisions (reg 47, Sch 6). For further description and critique of these provisions, see C Kilpatrick ‘The new 
UK retirement regime, employment law and pensions’ (2008) 37 Ind Law J 1. While universities accepted few 
requests to continue working, this may also be attributable to the relatively low number of requests received by 
each institution: Manfredi and Vickers, p 292. 
academics and the scope for workforce planning. In this context, it is important to consider 
whether these challenges will actually materialise for UK universities in the coming years. 
 
To explore these issues, this article considers comparative experiences of Australian 
universities, which have been operating without fixed retirement ages since the 1990s. 
Australian and UK universities ‘share common roots and common recent problems’.6 While 
there are clear differences between the two countries, it is informative to consider how a 
comparative jurisdiction has responded to the ageing academic workforce and comparative 
lessons for UK universities. This article commences with a legal doctrinal analysis of 
retirement ages in the UK and Australia (Parts 2 and 4a), and a review of potential issues 
arising from the abolition of the UK DRA in 2011 (Part 3). It then considers the 
consequences of the abolition of retirement ages for Australian universities, drawing on 
statistical evidence, academic literature, interviews with the National Tertiary Education 
Union (‘NTEU’)7 and organisational case studies of six Australian universities, to obtain a 
picture of the sector-wide and organisational consequences of abolishing mandatory 
retirement (Part 4b). Finally, in Part 5 the article outlines the ways in which the Australian 
experience may inform UK universities’ responses to the abolition of the DRA. 
2) Abolition of the UK default retirement age 
Prior to 2006, UK employers choosing to implement a normal retirement age (‘NRA’) for 
their workforce were protected by legislation, with employees dismissed on the ground of 
retirement after reaching the NRA or age 65 being unable to claim unfair dismissal or 
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redundancy payments.
8
 Protection of retirement ages was retained upon the introduction of 
age discrimination legislation in the UK: with the passing of the Employment Equality (Age) 
Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1031, an exception was made allowing for dismissal on the basis 
of retirement for workers at or over the age of 65, creating a national default retirement age 
(the DRA) (reg 30). Employers were also able to retain a NRA lower than 65 if it could be 
objectively justified.  
 
In January 2011, the UK government announced its intention to phase out the DRA from 
April 2011, and passed the Employment Equality (Repeal of Retirement Age Provisions) 
Regulations 2011, SI 2011/1069 (the 2011 Regulations) to facilitate the change. From 1 
October 2011, it has no longer been possible to retire an employee using the DRA. The 2011 
Regulations also removed retirement as a fair reason for dismissal in the Employment Rights 
Act 1996. Under the new Regulations, employers may still implement an employer-justified 
retirement age (‘EJRA’) so long as the requirement can be objectively justified as a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.  
 
There is significant legal uncertainty regarding when an EJRA will be ‘justified’.9 The case 
of Seldon v Clarkson Wright & Jakes (A partnership)
10
 provides some limited clarification of 
the law in this area. In that case, the UK Supreme Court considered the appeal of a solicitor 
who claimed he was subject to direct age discrimination when compulsorily retired from the 
partnership at age 65 in accordance with the partnership deed. While Mr. Seldon was retired 
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prior to the abolition of the DRA, the DRA did not apply to members of a partnership
11
 – 
therefore, retirement under the partnership deed had to be justified as necessary and 
proportionate in the interests of the partnership (the same test that now applies to all 
retirement ages). The issues to be considered by the Supreme Court included: (1) whether the 
aims identified by the employment tribunal (‘ET’) were capable of being legitimate aims; (2) 
whether the firm had to justify the application of the retirement clause in this particular case; 
and (3) whether relying on the retirement clause in this case was a proportionate means of 
achieving those aims.  
 
In relation to point (1), the Court concluded that the UK had decided to give employers and 
partnerships the flexibility to choose which objectives to pursue, so long as these objectives: 
(a) could count as ‘legitimate objectives of a public interest nature’; (b) were consistent with 
the state’s social policy aims; and (c) the means used to achieve the objectives were 
proportionate. Therefore, while it is for states to identify broad social policy aims, employers 
may articulate and apply those aims as they relate to their particular circumstances. This 
interpretation of ‘legitimate aims’ appears inconsistent with Article 6(1) of the Framework 
Directive, which provides that Member States, as opposed to employers, may provide that 
differences of treatment on the grounds of age shall not constitute discrimination.
12
 
 
In considering the case law of the CJEU, the UK Supreme Court categorised legitimate aims 
as falling within two broad classes: first, intergenerational fairness; and, second, dignity.
13
 In 
relation to the actual aims identified by the ET in this case – ensuring associates were given 
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the opportunity of partnership after a reasonable period; facilitating workforce planning; and 
limiting the need to use performance management to remove partners, thereby contributing to 
the firm’s ‘congenial and supportive culture’ – the Court noted that each had been recognised 
by the CJEU as legitimate social policy aims. The aims could also be related to the 
circumstances of the firm, making them legitimate in this particular case.
14
 Lord Hope noted 
that while the aims were directed to the firm’s own best interests, this did not prevent them 
being legitimate social policy aims.  
 
In relation to the second issue to be considered by the Supreme Court (whether the firm had 
to justify the application of the retirement clause in that particular case), the Court held that 
where a general rule is justified, the application of the rule to a specific case would also 
generally be justified. Therefore, a rule will only need to be justified in the particular 
circumstances of the business, not upon each application of the rule. As a result, the firm did 
not need to justify the application of the retirement rule to Mr. Seldon personally.  
 
Finally, in relation to point (3) (whether relying on the retirement clause was a proportionate 
means of achieving those aims), the Court held that the ET had not considered whether a 
retirement age of 65 was proportionate, as opposed to a retirement age more broadly: ‘there is 
a difference between justifying a retirement age and justifying this retirement age’.15 The 
case was referred back to the ET to consider this question.  
 
In May 2013, the ET held that the partnership’s retirement age of 65 was appropriate and 
reasonably necessary for achieving the aims of staff retention and planning for the future of 
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the firm.
16
 Associates ‘should see that upon the retirement of partners opportunities were 
created for succession to partnership’17 and that there was a ‘realistic long-term expectation 
as to when and where vacancies will arise’. 18  In deciding whether the age of 65 was 
proportionate, the ET considered the importance of consent, the existence of the DRA, the 
state pension age (‘SPA’), and the fact that the CJEU had considered 65 to be a proportionate 
age in the past. However, the ET also noted that the position ‘might have been different’ if 
Mr. Seldon had been retired after abolition of the DRA and planned changes to the SPA.
19
 
The ET’s decision on proportionality was upheld by the EAT in May 2014.20  
 
The Seldon decision means employers will be able to identify legitimate aims to support a 
retirement policy fairly readily, so long as those aims are relevant to their particular 
circumstances. This will be particularly straightforward where the organisation has a 
hierarchy with limited senior positions, as in a law firm or university. However, it will be 
more challenging to prove that the actual retirement age adopted is a proportionate means of 
achieving these aims. Following the abolition of the DRA, employers may find it difficult to 
justify 65 as a proportionate retirement age, as the government has deemed a DRA of 65 not 
to be appropriate for the general workforce. The ET’s further consideration of the Seldon case 
has provided limited guidance on this issue, as the DRA was still in place at the time of Mr. 
Seldon’s retirement. The ET’s decision on proportionality is limited to a particular historical 
moment, before the introduction of the 2011 Regulations and changes to the SPA. Indeed, the 
ET explicitly acknowledged the relevance of the DRA and SPA to the issue of 
proportionality: ‘The determination of the issue is relevant only to the difference in treatment 
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as applied to the Claimant at the relevant time…’.21 Given most employers have only needed 
to justify an EJRA since the passing of the 2011 Regulations,
22
 Seldon provides limited 
meaningful guidance on the proportionality issue. Thus, there remains significant legal 
uncertainty regarding when a retirement age will be justified. 
 
Perhaps as a consequence, employers appear unwilling to risk relying on fixed retirement 
ages. A 2013 Eversheds survey of 307 employers found that 2.9% of respondents had 
retained a policy of mandatory retirement (compared with 69% in a similar survey in 2011).
23
 
Further, 72% of respondents attributed their change of policy to the repeal of the DRA.
24
 
While employers had changed their policies in response to the 2011 Regulations, many did 
not feel positively about the change: 34% of respondents felt the abolition of the DRA had a 
negative or very negative impact on their organisation (compared with 14% who felt it had 
been positive); and 48% thought the DRA should be reinstated (compared to 43% who 
thought the law should remain as is).
25
 In contrast, the 2013 State of HR survey conducted by 
Speechly Bircham and King’s College London found that 19% of respondents had retained a 
retirement age for their workforce, the majority of whom failed to provide a justification for 
their retirement age when asked.
26
 
 
While these surveys indicate that employers are abandoning fixed retirement ages, they are 
not indicative of the UK as a whole. Both surveys had significant sampling issues: the 
                                                 
21
 Seldon v Clarkson Wright & Jakes [2013] UKET 1100275/2007 (14 May 2013) [64], [92]. 
22
 Though retirement ages under 65 also needed to be justified prior to the 2011 Regulations.  
23
 Eversheds ‘Eversheds UK HR e-briefing: how are employers managing without the default retirement age?’ 
(London: 2013) p 2. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid, pp 6–7. 
26
 R Thomas and others ‘Recovery in sight? The state of HR’ (London: 2013) p 9. 
Eversheds survey was sent to recipients of the law firm’s e-briefings newsletter (who are 
mostly likely to be large employers);
27
 and the State of HR survey was advertised online and 
emailed to a purchased list of senior HR contacts, and clients and contacts of Speechly 
Bircham and King’s College London. 28  Neither survey had a randomly selected nor 
specifically stratified sample and response rates are not available or applicable. It therefore 
remains unclear how far these trends extend and, indeed, whether they are trends at all.  
 
At the same time, anecdotal evidence from the UK university sector indicates that most 
universities have chosen to abandon fixed retirement ages, with the notable exceptions of the 
Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, which have elected to adopt an EJRA of 67 for 
academic staff.
29
 Given many UK universities applied mandatory retirement policies to their 
academic staff prior to the abolition of the DRA, and had limited experience of allowing staff 
to work beyond the DRA,
30
 this change may raise significant challenges for UK universities. 
3) Potential challenges of operating without a DRA 
In the government consultation process prior to the abolition of the DRA, respondents 
expressed concerns regarding how workplaces would operate without mandatory retirement. 
In particular, respondents felt abolition of the DRA would lead to:  
 an increase in the number of age discrimination claims; 
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 an increase in the use of, and dismissals based on, capability and performance 
measures; 
 difficulties in workplace and succession planning; and 
 a negative impact on younger workers.31 
 
In its response to the consultation, the government dismissed these concerns, stating that: 
 
The Government does not believe that the abolition of the DRA will have a negative 
impact on opportunities for younger workers. … the effect on economic activity and 
labour supply of removing the DRA is likely to increase economic activity in the 
economy as a whole. Furthermore, it is not often the case that younger and older 
workers are direct substitutes. Where there are genuine succession planning 
considerations (perhaps involving particular training requirements) employers could 
consider retaining a retirement age if it can be objectively justified. 
 
We agree that there is likely to be some limited increase in the use of capability 
procedures, which in turn is likely to lead to a number of Tribunal cases … . 
However, the removal of [the existing retirement procedures] will eliminate the 
current risk of cases being brought against employers on purely procedural grounds. 
The Government believes that performance management of staff should be carried out 
consistently and objectively for all staff, irrespective of age.
32
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The Eversheds survey (discussed above) provides some indication of the extent to which the 
respondents’ concerns have materialised in practice. As Table 1 demonstrates, a substantial 
proportion of employer respondents experienced negative impacts from the abolition of the 
DRA. However, these negative impacts are partly balanced by positive impacts experienced 
by other respondents, as illustrated by Table 2. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The Eversheds results provide an early snapshot of how some UK employers are 
experiencing the abolition of the DRA. It remains to be seen whether these trends continue 
after the change has been ‘bedded down’, and whether a broader sample of employers are 
experiencing the same issues. Given these challenges appear to be real issues for some 
employers, it is worth considering whether they are likely to have any particular impact in the 
university sector. 
 
a) Declining capacity and the need for performance management 
The government and respondents to the government consultation both recognised that the 
abolition of the DRA was likely to lead to an increase in the use of, and dismissals based on, 
capability and performance measures.
33
 Some UK universities believe that the removal of 
mandatory retirement will ‘induce more robust performance management’.34 At the same 
time, universities have traditionally lacked effective procedures for performance 
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management, particularly for academic staff. The (dated) Bett review of pay and conditions 
in UK universities identified the human resource (‘HR’) function ‘as an area of particular 
weakness that merited concerted action’.35 Government action to promote the development of 
university HR processes appears to have had limited effect in relation to performance 
management:
36
 in a 2006 survey of UK university HR directors, performance management 
was the ‘new initiative or practice’ respondents would most like to have introduced at their 
university,
37
 indicating that at least 51% of respondents felt that their performance 
management practices needed enhancement. Indeed, the HR practices that respondents rated 
as least effective in their institutions were performance management, staff 
planning/succession planning and managing poor performance.
38
 This implies that an 
increased emphasis on performance management for older workers could prove challenging 
for UK universities.
39
 
 
That said, we may question the assumed relationship between the abolition of the DRA and 
the increase in the use of performance management, which also assumes an association 
between ageing and declining capacity.
40
 Analysing submissions to the government 
consultation on the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1031, Sargeant 
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identifies a prevailing assumption amongst employers that ‘older workers would decline in 
competence and capability as they aged’.41 This reflects a decline theory of ageing, which 
neglects to consider potential benefits of the ageing process
42
 and the social construction of 
age and ageing.
43
 Assumptions regarding the relationship between age and competence are 
normally underpinned by ageist beliefs about how individuals vary biologically as the result 
of the ageing process.
44
 Chronological age is a weak predictor of an individual’s capacity to 
work productively
45
 and age is not a good proxy for capability.
46
 If anything, older workers 
form a more heterogeneous group than younger workers, as people age at different rates.
47
 
 
Further, the performance of academic staff may not decline significantly with age. 
Longitudinal studies have found two key requirements for maintaining high cognitive 
performance in later life, namely a high level of education in early life, and ongoing 
intellectual activity in older age.
48
 University academics likely satisfy both these 
requirements, reducing any link between declining capability and age. Management attitudes 
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and workplace culture may have a far more direct impact on the performance of older 
workers than chronological ageing.
49
 
 
While ageing may not result in a decline in work performance, a renewed focus on 
performance management in universities may increase the intensification of work more 
generally, undermining the quality of employment for many academics. In Australia, the 
NTEU ‘has a long held belief’ that performance management and its corollary, performance-
based pay schemes, ‘are merely devises [sic] seeking to intensify the work effort and increase 
the control of management’.50 Whether this is occurring in practice is explored further below.  
 
b) Sharing opportunities across generations 
The UK government has repeatedly rejected claims that the abolition of the DRA will reduce 
opportunities for younger workers: 
 
The employment of older workers should not be seen as a ‘younger versus older’ 
battle for jobs. Some people mistakenly believe that productive older workers should 
make way for younger workers and ‘free up the job market’ but the facts show this 
can create further problems for both the business and the wider labour market.
51
 
 
It is not the case that older people in work block jobs for younger people.
52
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 However, in enterprises with a fixed number of positions (including academia), it is possible 
that longer work careers for older workers will limit opportunities for others. While 
recognizing that the number of jobs in higher education is not as finite as those in one 
company, Manfredi and Vickers argue that 
 
the number of positions [in higher education] cannot just expand to meet demand for 
jobs. If senior positions are occupied by older workers, then it will be difficult for 
younger staff to gain promotion. Budgetary constraints can mean that it is not feasible 
for departments to make appointments at senior salary levels until there are vacancies 
to be filled.
53
  
 
Therefore, the ‘fair innings’ argument54 should perhaps be applied to the higher education 
sector as a whole.
55
  
 
 Concern about a lack of opportunities for younger academics is supported by 
empirical and anecdotal evidence of the UK academic employment market, which indicates 
that there are limited opportunities for early career academics in the UK, with many 
researchers experiencing a lack of employment security and limited prospects upon 
completing their PhD.
56
 The majority of UK PhD graduates leave academia, either due to a 
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lack of opportunities in universities or better opportunities in the private sector.
57
 Indeed, of 
UK-domiciled doctoral graduates from 2003–2007 working in the UK, only 23% of those 
surveyed worked as research staff in higher education institutions and 14% were employed as 
lecturers in higher education.
58
  
  
 That said, limited opportunities in higher education for younger academics preceded 
the abolition of the DRA: the question is whether the removal of the DRA will exacerbate the 
issue. As Table 3 demonstrates, few academics presently work into their 60s, with academics 
aged 61 and over constituting only 8.7% of the academic workforce in the UK, and 5.1% of 
full time staff.  
 
Table 3 about here 
  
Therefore, at present, it is unlikely that older academics are significantly limiting 
opportunities for younger workers. That said, while older workers represent a fairly small 
proportion of the UK academic workforce, this figure has still increased significantly over 
time: the number of academic staff over the age of 66 more than doubled between 2003–04 
and 2010–11.59 However, it does not appear that the UK academic workforce is ageing faster 
than the general population, and the age profile of permanent academic staff in England 
remained broadly stable between 1997 and 2010.
60
 That said, if the proportion of older 
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academics were to increase dramatically in coming years, this could have consequences for 
younger academics. 
 
The UK government’s response to concerns regarding reduced opportunities for younger 
workers is that: ‘Where there are genuine succession planning considerations … employers 
could consider retaining a retirement age if it can be objectively justified’.61 This is the 
approach that has been adopted by the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, where 
promoting fairness between the generations is a key justification for the use of a retirement 
age for academics: 
 
The EJRA is considered to provide a proportionate means of … promoting inter-
generational fairness and maintaining opportunities for career progression for those at 
particular stages of a career, given the importance of having available opportunities 
for progression across the generations, in order, in particular, to refresh the academic, 
research and other professional workforce and to enable them to maintain the 
University’s position on the international stage.62 
 
The University considers that [the EJRA] is important to ensure inter-generational 
fairness, … to ensure that the University continues to work towards a diverse 
workforce and to refresh the academy in providing opportunities for career 
development to those at an early stage of their academic career.
63
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 c) Workforce planning 
Abolition of the DRA may also lead to difficulties in workplace and succession planning, 
particularly if mandatory retirement has been used previously as a tool in workforce 
management.
64
 However, employee attrition is not solely dependent on retirement: 
employees can leave an employer for a variety of reasons, the majority of which are unrelated 
to retirement. Planning on the basis of a ‘known attrition profile’ due to mandatory retirement 
ignores the broader transience of modern employment.
65
 As individual career paths become 
increasingly complex and heterogeneous
66
 and the idea of a ‘job for life’ is dismissed as a 
thing of the past,
67
 workforce planning will become more complicated for employers. On its 
own, mandatory retirement is unlikely to make workforce planning substantially easier, 
particularly if mature HR processes are not in place to back it up.
68
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d) Budgetary issues 
Finally, the abolition of the DRA may have financial consequences for universities, as older 
workers may be more expensive than their younger counterparts. Indeed, budgetary factors 
led to most requests to continue working beyond the DRA being rejected in UK 
universities.
69
 
 
These concerns are reflected in the salary range of full time academic staff in the UK. 
According to Higher Education Statistics Agency data for 2012–13, of full time academic 
staff aged 66 and over in the UK, 57.6% were on a contract salary exceeding £56,467 (the top 
rate surveyed),
70
 compared with 20.8% of full time academic staff across all age groups. A 
substantial proportion of academics over the age of 55 were also in the same wage category, 
representing 52.4% of full time academics aged 61–65, and 41.5% of full time academics 
aged 56–60. In contrast, only 2.1% of full time academics aged 31–35 were on a similar 
wage. While these trends are understandable, given the extended period of time required to 
build an academic career, it demonstrates that older academics can be costly to universities. 
The abolition of the DRA may increase staff expenses for universities as older academics 
remain in employment.  
4) Comparative experience: the case of Australia 
Given these concerns, it is worth considering whether these challenges and implications have 
eventuated in another jurisdiction with a longer history of operating without a DRA. Further, 
it is useful to assess whether there are any comparative lessons for how UK universities 
might operate without a DRA.  
                                                 
69
 Manfredi and Vickers, above n 3, p 364. 
70
 However, with the low employment rates for older academics in the UK, this only equates to 330 academics. 
 a) Legislative provisions 
Compulsory retirement was abolished in Australia progressively over the 1990s and 2000s.
71
 
Under the current legislative provisions, compulsory retirement is prohibited within 
Australian workplaces, including universities.
72
 The Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) s 
18(2) provides:  
 
It is unlawful for an employer or a person acting or purporting to act on behalf of an 
employer to discriminate against an employee on the ground of the employee’s age … 
(c) by dismissing the employee … . 
 
However, discriminatory behaviour is exempt from the Act where the employee is ‘unable to 
carry out the inherent requirements of the particular employment because of his or her age’ (s 
18(4)–(5)).73  
 
Compulsory retirement is also prohibited by the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), which provides 
that an employer: 
                                                 
71
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 must not take adverse action [including dismissal] against a person who is an 
employee, or prospective employee, of the employer because of the person's … age (s 
351(1))
74
 
 
Again, this prohibition does not apply to action that is ‘taken because of the inherent 
requirements of the particular position concerned’ (s 351(2)(b)).75 
 
b) Consequences of abolishing retirement ages for university academics 
The abolition of compulsory retirement in Australian universities was not always a smooth 
process.
76
 At the time, Rosenman and McDonald wrote that ‘tertiary administrators are 
concerned about doddery old professors taking up office space, mumbling in front of classes 
and presenting a significant danger in laboratories.’77 Given universities have now had an 
opportunity to adjust to this new structure, it is informative to consider what sort of 
equilibrium (if any) has been achieved in relation to the employment of older academics. 
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Further, it is revealing to consider which (if any) of the concerns raised prior to the abolition 
of the DRA in the UK (discussed above) are evident in the Australian context.  
 
To analyse these issues, this article draws on statistical evidence, qualitative expert 
interviews with the NTEU and organisational case studies of six Australian universities. A 
case study methodology was selected for this research as it enabled the complexity of the 
employment of older academics to be studied in depth and interpreted in the organisational 
context.
78
 Cases were sampled purposively to reflect different organisational and university 
structures that were predicted to influence their exposure and response to an ageing academic 
workforce: both established, research-intensive universities and newer, more teaching-
focused universities were selected for study. A final determination and selection of cases was 
made based on practical considerations, including whether the university was physically 
accessible to the researcher.
79
 The case study organisations included four Group of Eight
80
 
universities and two members of the Australian Technology Network
81
.
82
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The case studies included semi-structured interviews with Directors or senior members of the 
universities’ Human Resources Units and a documentary review of university policies and 
other documents
83
 to add depth to the interview data, enrich the researcher’s understanding of 
the organisational context, further scrutinise the culture of the organisation
84
 and corroborate, 
augment and clarify the evidence collected through the interviews.
85
  
 
Drawing on this empirical evidence, the consequences of abolishing retirement ages for 
academics in Australia will be considered in relation to six factors: workforce participation 
rates for older academics; financial costs for universities; age discrimination claims; use of, 
and dismissals based on, capability and performance measures; workplace and succession 
planning; and the impact on younger workers.  
 
i) Workforce participation rates for older academics 
Workforce statistics indicate that a substantial proportion of Australian university academics 
are now remaining in employment beyond the age of 65. As illustrated in Table 4, in 2012, 
2,346 Australian academics were aged 65 or over (or 4.66% of the total academic workforce). 
In contrast, in 2012–13, academics aged 66 and over constituted only 0.46% of the full time 
UK academic workforce (see above). This trend also extends to those below the age of 65: in 
Australia, those aged 55+ comprise 25.65% of all academic staff, as compared with the UK, 
where those aged 56+ represent only 14.9% of the full time academic workforce. 
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Table 4 about here 
 
This national disparity may be related to the earlier abolition of mandatory retirement in 
Australia. Indeed, as Table 5 demonstrates, the percentage of total academic staff at 
Australian universities aged over 64 has increased from 0.96% in 1997 to 4.66% in 2012. On 
the face of it, the abolition of mandatory retirement may have contributed to the substantial 
growth in the number of older academics in Australia.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
However, these figures may also reflect the particular demographic challenge facing 
Australian universities. The significant growth in the Australian academic workforce in the 
1960s and 1970s has led to an academic population typified by ‘age heaping’, or a 
concentration of academics in particular age groups.
86
 It has been projected that Australian 
universities would lose between a fifth and a third of their staff due to retirement in the first 
decade of the 21st century,
87
 that half of the Australian academic workforce would retire in 
the next 15 years
88
 and that 16,400 new staff would be needed just to replace those retiring 
over the next 20 years, in addition to those required for increased student participation.
89
 In 
an online survey of Australian academics, 20.5% indicated that they intended to retire in the 
next five to ten years.
90
 It is therefore predicted that Australian universities will face a 
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‘massive challenge in academic staff recruitment’ in coming years due to the loss of a 
‘substantial proportion’ of academic staff.91 Concerns have also been raised that there are 
insufficient younger academics to fill the growing vacancies, representing a ‘lost generation’ 
of academics in Generation X.
92
 As a result of these demographic trends, it is unsurprising 
that older workers are strongly represented in the Australian academic population. Further, it 
is logical that Australian universities would wish to retain older academics who are good 
performers.
93
 
 
These trends were also evident in the case study organisations: in those universities, the 
percentage of academics over 50 ranged from 30% of academic staff (G8a) to 45% of 
academic staff (ATNb). Where recorded, the percentage of academics over 65 ranged from 
4.8% of academic staff (G8d) to 5.1% of academic staff (ATNa).
94
 This is broadly consistent 
with the sector-wide statistics presented above. According to one respondent, 50 was ‘still the 
sweet spot’ for a university’s age profile, as academics have not yet realised their full 
potential in their 40s (G8b). Therefore, Australian universities appear to value the experience 
and skills of their older academic workforce.  
 
Similarly, older academics increasingly wish to remain in work in Australia: the universities 
were united in the belief that academics do not generally wish to retire. According to one, 
‘academics are a very, very different breed of individuals’ compared to ordinary employees, 
as the ‘great majority’ never stop working (G8b). Respondents attributed this to the fact that 
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academics ‘get paid to do what they love’, and are always at work (G8b). Academia is ‘more 
than a job … [it’s] a way of life’ (ATNb). As a result, academics never want to stop being at 
work (or to retire) (G8b) and, even where academics do retire, they ‘don’t see themselves as 
retired’ (G8d). While some universities were not being ‘inundated with everyone staying on’ 
(ATNa), others noted that ‘people never leave’ (G8c) and ‘60 is the new 50’ for academics 
(G8d).  
 
Thus, while Australian universities have experienced a significant increase in the proportion 
of older academic staff since 1997, this may be partly the result of Australia’s particular 
demographic challenges in academia, and partly related to academics’ desire to remain in 
employment. It is thus possible that a similar trend will occur in the UK with the removal of 
the DRA (though perhaps not to the same extent). This may have substantial implications for 
the UK higher education sector.  
 
ii) Financial costs for universities 
While it is desirable to retain older academics’ skills and experience, the number of older 
academics in Australia is likely to have significant cost implications for universities. Table 6 
depicts the classifications of Australian academic staff by age group. Of academic staff aged 
over 64 in 2012, 1,415 (or 60.3%) were classified above the level of senior lecturer. This may 
be compared with academic staff aged 35–39, of whom only 7% were classified above the 
level of senior lecturer in 2012. Overall, those aged 65+ comprised 10.63% of Australian 
academics above senior lecturer level in 2012, despite only representing 4.66% of the total 
workforce. 
 
Table 6 about here 
As Bexley, James and Arkoudis note, the number of academics classified as Senior Lecturer 
or above is the only group to have increased in size as a proportion of the total academic 
workforce since 1996, largely due to the ageing academic population.
95
 This has created ‘top 
heavy’ and expensive academic structures, which may limit the ability of universities to 
employ young academics: the wages for the most senior academics are around double those 
of a junior (Level A) employee.
96
 This may have serious consequences for university budgets 
and overall staffing costs. Indeed, the Australian higher education sector has experienced an 
increase in staffing expenditure relative to revenue since 2010, with the average staffing cost 
rising from 50.71% of revenue in 2010 to 53.79% in 2012.
97
 Further, if an increasing wage 
bill limits the number of junior academics universities can employ, this may also affect 
universities’ capacity to respond to increasing student populations, as junior academics are 
(rightly or wrongly) often made responsible for teaching large undergraduate courses and 
shouldering significant teaching loads.  
 
iii) Number of age discrimination claims 
In Australia, age discrimination claims can be made under federal, state or territory anti-
discrimination laws and, in the area of employment, under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). 
Therefore, the number of age discrimination claims needs to be considered at federal and 
state/territory level and in relation to employment claims. Under the federal Age 
Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth), employees may make a complaint of age discrimination to 
the Australian Human Rights Commission (‘AHRC’). The number of age discrimination 
complaints received by the Commission in the last five years is presented in Figure 1. 
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 Figure 1 about here 
 
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the number of age discrimination complaints received by the 
AHRC has remained fairly constant since 2008. Further, complaints under the Age 
Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) make up only a small proportion of the total complaints 
received by the Commission: in 2012–13, 2177 complaints were received overall, meaning 
age discrimination was raised in only 7.2% of complaints. This percentage has also remained 
relatively constant over the last five years, as depicted in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Of these complaints, an even smaller proportion relate to employment, and even fewer are 
likely to relate to older workers. In 2012–13, 103 (or 57.5%) of complaints received by the 
AHRC under the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) related to employment.
98
 This indicates 
that the number of age discrimination complaints to the AHRC arising from employment is 
fairly low, and is not increasing significantly over time.  
 
In relation to the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), only 56 or 7% of discrimination complaints 
received by the Fair Work Ombudsman between 1 July 2009 and 30 June 2010 related to 
age.
99
 While age was the second most common attribute specified in complaints in 2010–11, 
this still represented only 152 complaints, or 13% of all complaints.
100
 Age was not a most 
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common attribute specified in 2011–12 or 2012–13, indicating that 2010–11 may have been 
an exceptional year for age complaints.  
 
At the State level, the NSW Anti-Discrimination Board received 365 enquiries (or 6.3% of all 
enquiries) relating to age discrimination in 2012–13, 212 of which related to employment.101 
However, the Board received only 35 formal complaints of age discrimination over the same 
period (representing 3.32% of all complaints and 6.22% of employment complaints).
102
  
 
In Victoria, the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission received 320 
enquiries relating to age discrimination against older people in 2012–13.103 That same year, 
the Commission received 84 complaints relating to age in employment, down from 109 in 
2011–12.104 This represents 3.14% of all complaints received by the Commission, and 4.72% 
of all employment complaints.
105
 
 
Overall, these figures indicate that age discrimination complaints are relatively infrequent in 
Australia: while a number of queries are received at both state and federal level in any given 
year, few translate to formal complaints, and many complaints do not relate to the field of 
employment.
106
 Further, few of these complaints specifically relate to universities: in Victoria 
(the only jurisdiction in which such data is available), only 77 discrimination complaints 
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were made against all educational institutions (including universities) across all grounds in 
2012–13.107 
 
Similarly, reported cases against universities on the basis of age discrimination are rare. Only 
two such cases were reported between 2000 and 2013: in Rochas v The University of 
Sydney,
108
 the claimant alleged age discrimination in the University’s appointment processes; 
and in Vanden Driesen v Edith Cowan University
109
 the applicant raised a claim of age 
discrimination in the context of a redundancy dispute. Overall, the statistics relating to claims 
and complaints of age discrimination, and the limited number of cases relating to age 
discrimination against universities, indicate that the removal of mandatory retirement has not 
led to a significant increase in age discrimination claims. Indeed, it appears that few age 
discrimination claims are brought against universities in Australia. However, this may not 
reflect an absence of age discrimination: according to the NTEU, older academics are often 
targeted for redundancy in Australian universities. While the union has considered bringing a 
claim of age discrimination in the past, ‘enough members are always saying never stand 
between a 63 year old academic and [a] $150,000 pay-out’. Financial incentives may deter 
older academics from alleging age discrimination. Further, institutional barriers, a lack of 
legal advice and/or difficulties proving discrimination may also deter older workers from 
bringing a claim.  
 
The small number of reported age discrimination claims is consistent with the experience of 
the case study organisations: no university had experienced a significant number of age 
discrimination claims from older academics. Indeed, the majority could not recall any age 
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discrimination claims being brought against their institution: ‘I can’t think of any’ (G8a, also 
ATNb); others had not received an age discrimination claim in the last seven years (G8b) or 
the last decade (G8d) and did not see age discrimination claims as being ‘a real problem’ 
(ATNa). Instead, respondents perceived issues of gender and race to be more important for 
universities, being areas that receive legal claims ‘much more frequently’ (ATNa, also G8c, 
G8d). 
 
Only one university noted experiencing legal difficulties in attempting to get a staff member 
to retire: in that case, the staff member was offered a pre-retirement contract and, when 
amicable discussions broke down, the academic went ‘completely legal’ (G8c). However, 
even in this case, the claim did not relate to age discrimination, but was more concerned with 
the kind of separation agreement to be negotiated with the university (G8c). That university 
had experience two to three claims in the last two to three years, though no claims were 
explicitly related to age discrimination (G8c). While a small number in absolute terms, the 
claims were very time consuming when they occurred (G8c). 
 
iv) Performance management and capability dismissals 
As with the UK, Australian universities have traditionally been ambivalent towards 
performance management structures.
110
 As Hughes and Sohler note, there is ‘considerable 
disagreement about whether the whole enterprise [of performance management and 
appraisal] is in fact feasible or desirable … in the university context’.111 There has been 
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‘much anguish’ about whether the ‘special nature’ of academic work,112 the special culture of 
universities
113
 or their characteristics and values
114
 are compatible with performance 
appraisal systems. In particular, academic freedom and collegial governance, which are 
arguably essential to the academic endeavour, may fundamentally conflict with the aims of 
performance management, and make it impracticable to implement within a university 
context.
115
 
 
Despite these concerns, performance appraisal was first introduced into Australian 
universities in 1988 by an industrial award of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
which linked pay increases to assessments of performance and introduced an academic 
appraisal system.
116
 The award was amended in 1990 to also include performance appraisals 
for developmental purposes.
117
 With the growth of enterprise bargaining, universities may 
now negotiate performance appraisal systems with union representatives at the local level, 
allowing greater diversity and flexibility between universities (and, potentially, the growth of 
the managerial prerogative at the local level).
118
 The growth of performance management in 
Australian universities has been linked with a broader shift towards ‘a corporate-managerial 
model of mission statements and performance management’ in the sector.119 
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 While there is now a reasonable history of performance management in Australian 
universities, concerns have been raised regarding the effectiveness of its implementation. 
There is fundamental disagreement regarding whether performance management should 
pursue summative (judgmental) or formative (developmental) goals.
120
 While a survey of 
Australian business academics found that the vast majority (93%) were supportive of the 
concept of performance management, and believed performance management should focus 
on staff development and motivation, their actual experience of performance appraisal 
systems had been as a ‘controlling mechanism’.121 Stavretis argues that universities’ inability 
to clearly articulate the purposes of performance appraisal and focus on its effective 
implementation has led to ‘widespread cynicism and a ritual dance of compliance that 
demonstrates palpably low engagement’ by staff. 122  This is consistent with the NTEU’s 
observations: ‘I think most of the heads of school, although they wouldn’t say it, see most of 
the performance management systems as a bit of a joke.’ 
 
Performance appraisal systems thus face significant practical challenges in their 
implementation.
123
 It is therefore unsurprising that the abolition of the academic retirement 
ages in Australia has not led to a significant increase in capability and performance-related 
dismissals. In the case study organisations, performance measures were not used more 
frequently to manage older academics. Respondents explicitly rejected any correlation 
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between age and performance: that is ‘just not right’ (G8b) and older academics were 
‘performance managed like anybody else’ (G8b). However, older academics may need to be 
‘moved on’ if they were not willing to engage with new teaching methods or research 
(ATNa): some older academic staff want to remain at work and are in ‘denial [of their] own 
capacity’ to do so (ATNb). In these cases, it was easier to encourage someone to retire than to 
use ‘harsher methods’ such as performance management (ATNa).  
 
Thus, the limited use of performance management for older academics may reflect the 
limited capacity (and inclination) of universities to effectively deploy performance measures. 
According to the NTEU, Australian universities are reluctant to use performance 
management for academics, and ‘performance management in the sense that it leads to 
people being given the axe’ is basically unheard of.  However, this does not preclude 
informal performance-related discussions: ‘It may well be that a head of school says to one of 
our members, “Look, I really reckon you’re not cut out to be an academic, you should start 
looking for another job,” or, “You’re getting on a bit, … maybe it’s time you thought about 
retiring.”  I’m sure that sort of thing goes on and it leads to people leaving.’   
 
Instead of using formal performance management processes, Australian universities are 
increasingly relying on redundancy as a ‘proxy for performance’ management (NTEU) (and, 
perhaps, as a proxy for mandatory retirement). According to the NTEU, ‘the number of 
people who are performance managed (as distinct from conduct managed) out of the 
institutions is infinitesimally small.’ This is backed up by turnover statistics for the sector: in 
2012, 7.9% of staff within Australian higher education ceased work due to ‘Voluntary 
Employee Initiated Turnover’ (down from 10.5% in 2008), 6.4% due to ‘Fixed-term Contract 
Expiration’ (contracts not being renewed), 0.96% due to ‘Voluntary University Initiated 
Turnover’ and 0.66% due to ‘Involuntary University Initiated Turnover’ (including 
performance and conduct management).
124
 However, the NTEU estimates that between half 
and two-thirds of ‘voluntary terminations’ in Australian universities ‘are not voluntary at all’: 
‘voluntary university initiated is essentially would you like to take this package or would you 
like us to sack you’. This reliance on ‘packages’ may have significant financial consequences 
for the university sector as a whole, and may limit the funds available for core university 
functions like teaching and research.  
 
While there are few performance-related dismissals, the NTEU still believes that 
performance management has intensified academic work in Australia: ‘these things cause 
people to work a lot harder and to stress a lot more than they used to, and it might mean that 
they’re going to be declared redundant.  So I’m sure it’s increased work intensification.’ This 
is concerning, as Australian university staff already exhibit high levels of psychological 
strain: in a 2002 survey, 50% of university staff were identified as being at risk of 
psychological illness (compared with 19% of the general population).
125
 In describing this 
survey, the NTEU observed: ‘Obviously that’s dated, but nobody would seriously suggest 
that anything’s got better since then.’ 
 
v) Workforce and succession planning 
The removal of mandatory retirement may have also complicated workforce and succession 
planning for Australian universities. Some universities are now investing significant time and 
energy in workforce planning, including by compiling annual workforce planning reports and 
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appointing dedicated workforce planners or workforce planning units.
126
 Again, this may 
reflect the significant demographic challenges facing Australian higher education: if half of 
the Australian academic workforce are to retire by 2025,
127
 universities will need to put in 
place clear succession plans to address the likely loss of academic talent. Indeed, in this 
context, the abolition of mandatory retirement may help to relieve universities’ succession 
planning problems, as there is the possibility that key staff will remain at work for a longer 
period.  
 
The case study universities noted the challenge of workplace and succession planning with an 
ageing academic workforce. Respondents recognised the need to ‘refresh the discipline’ with 
younger, cheaper academics, who brought enthusiasm and new approaches to the university 
(G8b) and who were willing to engage with new methods of teaching and increase the 
university’s research profile (ATNa, ATNb). Some universities proactively facilitated and 
promoted succession planning, conducting extensive workforce planning exercises to analyse 
the age profile and intentions of their workforce (ATNa, G8d) and, in one case, employing a 
specialist workforce planner (G8d). The structure of university pension schemes also gave 
universities some certainty for planning, as there were financial disincentives to stay at work 
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beyond the age of 60 under the defined benefit rules of some plans (ATNa).
128
 Universities 
also used pre- and post-retirement contracts to achieve some certainty as to when individuals 
would retire.
129
  
 
The NTEU offered an alternative perspective: while some universities
130
 were proactively 
managing workforce planning, most do not see workforce planning as a central 
responsibility: ‘The idea that there’s actually a thing called the university that has to plan its 
workforce … they just don’t accept that.’ Therefore, the absence of mandatory retirement is 
not complicating workforce planning – instead, workforce planning is just not occurring. This 
may reflect an over-supply of potential academic staff in Australia: ‘There’s 15,000–20,000 
people in Australia who are fully qualified who could take an academic job tomorrow if there 
was one going, so why would you need to plan for anything?’ 
 
Further, while a lack of fixed retirement ages may complicate workforce planning, it is likely 
to be less detrimental than constantly shifting government priorities and targets. As 
universities are expected increasingly to shift and respond to government prerogatives, 
workforce planning has become highly challenging, as it is uncertain where funding will be 
targeted in future years and what goals universities will be required to meet in the short, 
medium and long term. In this uncertain environment, it is nearly impossible to plan for 
future workforce needs, with or without mandatory retirement ages in place.
131
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 vi) Impact on younger academics 
The distinct demographic trends in the Australian academic workforce (discussed above) may 
mean that intergenerational fairness is less of an issue in the Australian context than in the 
UK. If universities are struggling to recruit academics, there are likely to be plentiful 
opportunities for both younger and older academics. That said, the NTEU has firmly rejected 
the idea that universities are struggling to recruit academic workers: 
 
there are 12,000 PhD qualified people already working in the system on an hourly 
paid basis. So the idea that the ageing academic workforce means that there’s some 
problem of labour supply, our view is that’s just bunkum. … There’s an endless 
supply of further victims who are willing to volunteer [to be academics]. 
 
The NTEU’s comments flag the issue of casualisation in Australian academia: while many 
younger workers are employed in academic roles, they are often consigned to insecure casual 
employment, with few later progressing to permanent academic posts. According to May et 
al, there are 67,000 casual academic staff in Australian academia, and 52% of casual 
Australian academics are aged under 35, making the age profile of casual teaching staff 
‘considerably younger’ than those in ongoing posts.132 Further, in 2012, nearly 87% of Level 
A academics were employed on fixed-term contracts.
133
 This indicates that younger and 
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junior academics are occupying less secure and more precarious roles than their older 
colleagues. 
 
This trend is also reflected in the growth of senior ongoing academic positions in Australia. 
The number of senior academic posts (at Levels D and E) has risen from 19% of all academic 
posts in 1996 to 25% in 2008.
134
 This has occurred at the expense of lower level posts: the 
number of Level B positions has experienced a ‘hollowing out’ since 1996, dropping from 
36% to 32% of academic positions over the same period.
135
 Overall, the total growth of non-
casual staff between 1996 and 2008 at Level E has been 54%, with Level B only 
experiencing 7% growth. This indicates that there were significantly more senior positions in 
Australian academia in 2008 than in 1996, with fewer junior academics being employed in 
non-casual positions as a result. Therefore, May et al argue that the ‘lost generation’ of 
academics described by Hugo is not lost: rather, they have just been consigned to ‘casual, 
insecure teaching roles’.136  
 
Thus, while there are opportunities for younger workers in Australian academia, these are in 
unstable and precarious employment. Casual employment is associated with isolation, limited 
professional opportunities, poor conditions, uncertainty and insecurity
137
 and may have 
negative health implications.
138
 It is at least arguable that this is related to the lack of 
retirement ages for older Australian academics: older academics tend to occupy permanent or 
tenured positions, reducing the number of such roles available for younger academics. 
Further, turnover in Australian universities appears to be decreasing, with average total 
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annual turnover dropping from 17.98% in 2008 to 15.89% in 2012.
139
 Turnover is also lower 
in more senior posts: the average turnover at Level E was 8.34% in 2012.  
 
However, according to the NTEU, turnover of around 16% is still high for any sector (see 
further the discussion of ‘voluntary’ turnover above). Further, casualisation is not restricted 
to younger academic workers: older academics are also often employed on casual contracts. 
Casualisation is increasing for all academic employees, as ‘run[ning] a unit using casual 
employment is spectacularly cheaper’ (NTEU). Therefore, with insecure government 
funding: ‘The logic of the cost of presenting courses [with casual staff] is just so 
overwhelming that if you’re short of money, then the thing to do is to casualise your 
teaching.’ (NTEU) Therefore, these concerns may reflect broader issues with higher 
education in Australia, and be only tangentially related to the removal of mandatory 
retirement ages.  
 
There was a mixed response from the case study universities regarding whether operating 
without a DRA had a negative impact on younger or aspiring academics. At some 
universities, intergenerational fairness was an issue in specific faculties (such as Arts), where 
it was easy to recruit academics and individuals tended to ‘stay on’, resulting in low turnover 
and making it ‘tough’ for younger academics to enter the system (ATNa, also ATNb). In 
these specific contexts, older academics could be perceived as ‘occupying headcount’ 
(ATNb) and preventing the university from refreshing talent – ‘[we] can’t recruit new blood’ 
(ATNb). Concerns were also raised that many young academics were employed on fixed 
term contracts, rather than holding permanent positions like their older counterparts (G8c, 
G8d). In these circumstances, it was more an issue of the quality and security of employment 
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available to younger academics (G8c) than whether work was available at all. Two 
respondents also expressed concern about the ‘jobless generation’, which ‘really concerns 
me’ (G8c, also G8d). Thus, for some universities concerns about a lack of intergenerational 
fairness were ‘very much playing out’ (G8d).  
 
For other universities, intergenerational fairness was not seen as such an issue: when 
professors retired, the university would employ a (junior) lecturer to replace them, ensuring 
that younger generations were given the opportunity to enter academia (G8a). Further, 
promotion was based on merit, not the availability of positions or budgetary considerations, 
meaning it was not necessary for an older academic to retire before another could be 
promoted (G8a). However, this does imply that an ageing academic workforce could have 
significant budgetary ramifications, as older academics with a longer work history are more 
likely to be promoted to more senior (and expensive) positions, and there are few means of 
controlling the budget by limiting promotions. This has created ‘top heavy’ academic 
structures in many areas (G8a).  
 
To ensure intergenerational fairness, one university adopted a different approach: older 
academics were approached and encouraged to retire and go on the ‘pension payroll’, thereby 
allowing a younger academic to be employed, in exchange for an honorary appointment 
(G8b). As an honorary appointee, academics receive all the benefits of employment – just 
without pay (G8b).  This appeal to academics’ altruism and the idea of intergenerational 
fairness was often successful – and it ‘doesn’t hurt to ask’ (G8b). However, other universities 
doubted whether this approach could be effectively applied to their workforce (ATNa, ATNb, 
G8c). That said, one respondent felt it was ‘incumbent on all of us to question whether [we 
have] reached [our] use-by-date’, making intergenerational fairness a personal responsibility 
(G8c). 
5) Lessons for the United Kingdom 
This comparative perspective offers a number of lessons for universities and other employers 
in the UK, particularly in relation to ‘intergenerational fairness’ and ‘dignity’ arguments used 
to justify a retirement age in the Seldon case.  
 
a) Intergenerational fairness 
The significant ‘age heaping’ typifying Australian academia, the presence of a relatively 
generous defined benefit pension scheme and the projected retirement of many academics 
may have tempered any negative impact from the removal of mandatory retirement in 
Australian universities. That said, the removal of mandatory retirement may have reduced the 
number of ongoing academic posts available to younger workers, and the growth in the 
number of senior academic positions may have reduced the number of junior academics 
recruited. In this sense, the removal of default retirement ages may have had (and, indeed, be 
having) a very real impact on younger academics in Australia. That said, while there are 
concerns regarding intergenerational fairness in Australian universities, it is difficult to link 
the removal of mandatory retirement with any specific consequences in practice. Indeed, 
many of the issues raised above, particularly relating to the casualisation of academia, may 
reflect broader global trends in higher education, unrelated to the removal of the DRA. 
 
Given UK academia is not experiencing the same demographic challenge as Australia, and 
there are already limited opportunities for early career academics in the UK, the removal of 
the DRA may make future prospects for younger UK academics particularly grim. Thus, 
concerns about intergenerational fairness expressed in the Seldon decision may well be 
warranted in the university context.
140
 While the ‘fair innings’ argument that underlies 
concerns about intergenerational fairness has been criticised extensively in the literature,
141
 
the argument may hold where the internal labour market of a firm has rigid ‘lines of 
progression’ and ‘internal career ladders’, limited ‘ports of entry’ and workers have limited 
mobility between firms.
142
 This may be the case in some universities, supporting the adoption 
of mandatory retirement in selected UK institutions. Indeed, intergenerational fairness was a 
key aim behind the adoption of EJRAs at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge (see 
further above). 
 
b) Dignity 
The second category of legitimate aims identified in the Seldon decision – dignity – was also 
used to justify the Oxford EJRA (though not that at Cambridge): 
 
The EJRA is considered to provide a proportionate means of… in the context of the 
distinctive collegial processes through which the University is governed, avoiding 
invidious performance management and redundancy procedures to consider 
the  termination of employment at the end of a long career, where the performance of 
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the individual and/or the academic or other professional needs of the University have 
changed.
143
 
 
As noted above, justifying retirement provisions due to the need to avoid ‘humiliating’ 
performance management for older workers
144
 risks conflating age with capacity, and 
wrongly assumes that ageing is necessarily a process of decline and deterioration.
145
 Indeed, 
the Australian universities expressly rejected a link between age and declining capacity, and 
few universities used performance management to remove older academics. However, this 
may be because it is easier to encourage someone to retire than to use ‘harsher methods’ such 
as performance management. The limited use of performance management for older 
academics in Australia may reflect the limited capacity (and inclination) of universities to 
effectively deploy performance measures for all staff (and not just older academics).  
 
A disinclination to use performance management may exacerbate the use of ‘voluntary’ 
redundancy to manage older staff. This risks treating all older academics as a group, rather 
than assessing individual capacity. As Fredman argues, ‘it is … an affront to the dignity of 
the individual to assume that he or she automatically shares the characteristics of everyone 
else in his or her age group’.146 Rather than relying on stereotypical assumptions of capability 
based on age, people should be treated as individuals, and have their capabilities assessed on 
an individual basis. Relying on redundancy as a performance management tool denies older 
workers the opportunity to respond to and address performance concerns, and risks breeding 
resentment and ill will among employees. Thus, the removal of mandatory retirement may 
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have implications for employees’ dignity, though not in the way anticipated by the court in 
Seldon.  
 
As a consequence, the removal of mandatory retirement for academics in Australia may be 
cultivating a negative work culture in universities and, contradictorily, encouraging age 
discrimination against older academics. These results therefore flag issues regarding how 
Australian universities are managing an ageing academic workforce in practice: the actual 
strategies being used by universities (such as ‘voluntary’ redundancies) raise significant 
concerns as to the equity of employment practices and how public funds are being used. 
According to the NTEU: 
 
that concern which was raised in the early 90s by [university] management about the 
abolition of compulsory retirement, those concerns that were raised, I haven’t heard 
those concerns raised probably in the last decade.  So they’ve found a way to solve 
the problem, and yet they’re probably also quite happy to have some of those people 
still working into their 70s because they’re doing good work, but anyone that they 
don’t like, think is getting too old, or they just think they can replace with somebody 
who’s prepared to work harder perhaps, then they can get rid of them anyway using 
redundancy. 
 
Thus, the removal of mandatory retirement may be encouraging cloaked age discrimination 
in universities, under the guise of ‘redundancy’ and, to a lesser extent, ‘performance 
management’. How these processes are being used at an organisational level is beyond the 
scope of this article. However, it is an area that warrants serious consideration in future 
research. 
 While the removal of mandatory retirement may be encouraging covert age discrimination, 
this is also a risk associated with adopting an EJRA. The implementation of an EJRA may 
lead to unequal treatment of older workers across different departments, and may require 
older workers to ‘over-perform’ compared with junior staff to justify their retention beyond 
retirement age.
147
 Thus, EJRAs may also perpetuate and exacerbate unequal treatment of 
older academics. There is a need for deeper exploration of how universities are managing an 
ageing academic workforce, and the implications of EJRAs and removing retirement ages for 
discriminatory practices against older workers. 
6) Conclusions and future research 
In sum, then, this article provides no definitive answers regarding what is likely to happen in 
the UK with the abolition of mandatory retirement. Based on the Australian experience, many 
concerns relating to extended academic working lives have not occurred: there has been no 
increase in age discrimination claims or the incidence of performance management. 
However, there has been an increase in the number of academics working past 65, and 
universities may be using alternative, discriminatory methods (such as redundancy) to 
manage an ageing workforce. Extending working lives for older academics may also be 
affecting the employment prospects of younger academics, particularly in relation to the 
availability of permanent academic posts at junior levels.  
 
Therefore, for UK universities electing not to adopt an EJRA, it will be necessary to carefully 
monitor workforce composition in the years to come. In particular, universities should be 
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attuned to whether younger academics are being disproportionately consigned to casual and 
short-term roles, and how many roles are being advertised at junior levels year-on-year. 
Further, universities should watch for the emergence of discriminatory practices that may act 
as a proxy for retirement, such as the use of ‘voluntary’ redundancy. It is not guaranteed that 
universities will experience negative consequences as a result of the removal of the DRA. 
Indeed, universities may experience improved staff retention, increased workforce morale 
and retain vital skills and experience. That said, it is imperative that the intergenerational 
impact of an ageing workforce is not disregarded. Future research should consider how UK 
universities are responding to the abolition of the DRA, and whether these risks are being 
actively managed in practice.  
 
 
Negative impacts of abolition of DRA Per cent experienced 
Blocking opportunities for younger workers 48% 
Difficulties in succession planning 64% 
More management time on performance 
management 
29% 
Increase in ill-health absence 21% 
Increased cost of redundancies 24% 
Increased cost of employee benefits 24% 
Increase in age discrimination claims 4% 
 
Table 1: Employer experiences of negative impacts from the abolition of the 
DRA (Source: Eversheds 2013) 
  
 Positive impacts of abolition of DRA Per cent experienced 
Improved retention of skills and knowledge 33% 
Reduction in management time spent on 
retirement procedures 
22% 
Savings in recruitment and training costs 17% 
Improved worker morale 10% 
Improved performance management of older 
workers 
9% 
Reduction in age discrimination claims 6% 
 
Table 2: Employer experiences of positive impacts from the abolition of the DRA 
(Source: Eversheds 2013) 
  
 Age group Number of full 
time academic 
staff 
Number of part 
time academic 
staff 
Per cent of UK 
academic staff 
30 and under 15200 8925 13.0 
31–40 years 37940 14590 28.3 
41–50 years 35470 16090 27.8 
51–60 years 27600 13540 22.2 
61 and over 6290 9935 8.7 
Total 122500 63090 100 
 
Table 3: Composition of UK higher education academic staff by age group and mode of 
employment, 2012–13 (Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency) 
  
 Age Group Number of academic staff Percentage of all academic staff 
< 25 198 0.39 
25–29 2,630 5.22 
30–34 6,404 12.72 
35–39 6,803 13.51 
40–44 6,717 13.34 
45–49 7,278 14.45 
50–54 7,408 14.71 
55–59 6,241 12.40 
60–64 4,324 8.59 
> 64 (a) 2,346 4.66 
Total Persons 50,349 100 
 
Table 4: Australian University academic staff by age, 2012 (Source: Australian 
Government Department of Industry) 
  
  
Above 
Senior 
Lecturer 
Senior 
Lecturer 
(Level 
C) 
Lecturer 
(Level 
B) 
Below 
Lecturer 
(Level 
A) 
Total 
Academic 
Staff 
Percentage 
of total 
academic 
workforce 
1997 168 68 55 28 319 0.96 
1998 184 71 65 20 340 1.04 
1999 193 91 69 30  383 1.18 
2000 205 95 123 32 455 1.37 
2001 214 110 143 30 497 1.48 
2002 241 125 141 30 537 1.55 
2003 308 143 163 33 647 1.80 
2006
148
 603 258 207 51 1119 2.78 
2007 729 302 258 54 1343 3.18 
2008 816 318 280 55 1469 3.37 
2009 798 292 291 55 1436 3.15 
2010 1,002 324 315 69 1710 3.64 
2011 1,165 379 342 73 1959 4.05 
2012 1,415 437 415 79 2,346 4.66 
 
 
Table 5: Australian University academic staff over 64 by level of appointment, 1997-
2012 (Source: Australian Government Department of Industry, author’s own 
calculations) 
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 Age Group 
Above 
Senior 
Lecturer 
Senior 
Lecturer 
(Level C) 
Lecturer 
(Level B) 
Below 
Lecturer 
(Level A) 
Sub-total 
Academic 
Classifications 
< 25 0 <5 np 177 198 
25–29 np np np 1,783 2,630 
30–34 85 595 3,043 2,681 6,404 
35–39 476 1,688 3,205 1,434 6,803 
40–44 1,307 1,940 2,607 863 6,717 
45–49 2,263 2,104 2,258 653 7,278 
50–54 2,822 2,043 2,057 486 7,408 
55–59 2,692 1,713 1,532 304 6,241 
60–64 2,244 1,024 897 159 4,324 
> 64 (a) 1,415 437 415 79 2,346 
Total 
Persons 
13,307 11,596 16,827 8,619 50,349 
np: not published 
Note: (a) includes a few staff whose ages are unknown 
 
Table 6: Australian University academic staff by age and level of appointment, 2012 
(Source: Australian Government Department of Industry) 
 
